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Szescilo: Citizen's Co-Production of Public Safety

CITIZEN’S CO-PRODUCTION OF PUBLIC SAFETY AS A
SYMPTOM OF STATE FAILURE:
THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICAN VIGILANTISM
Dawid Sześciło 1

ABSTRACT
The growing interest in co-production of public services reflects the
need to liberate from the dichotomy between state and market provision.
Whereas the concept of co-production is not new, it gained broader recognition
among public administration scholars in recent years. What is characteristic for
the academic discourse on this idea, is a strong focus on the benefits of coproduction such as effectiveness, efficiency, responsiveness and quality of
public services. This article provides more critical insight into co-production of
public security by exploring the phenomenon of vigilantism in South Africa.
The major aim of this article is to examine the major reasons for the expansion
of vigilantism in this country and to specify the key risks associated with this
process.
INTRODUCTION
Co-production of public services is now among the hottest topics in the
international academic discourse in the area of public management. However,
this concept itself is not a recent invention. It appeared in the American
literature during the 60s; however, the first wave of greater interest in this model
was triggered by the work of a research team at the University of Indiana in the
1970s and early 1980s (Parks et al. 1981). A new aspect of the theoretical debate
in recent years is the perception of co-production as a potential strategy to
address the challenges faced by modern welfare states (Pestoff, Osborne and
Brandsen 2006), or as a missing element in the debates on the reform of
democracies and welfare states (Pestoff 2006). The initial discourse on coproduction had a rather descriptive orientation, and was based on the
recognition of the complex character of public service delivery, which was
different from typical production schemes. A particular insight was that many
public services cannot be produced solely by the providers, and require a more
or less extensive engagement by the customers. For instance, a public school
cannot provide a good quality education without efforts by the students; and a
public library is unable to ensure a high level of book circulation without the
contributions from its patrons (De Witte and Geys 2012). Co-production,
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therefore, was initially perceived as an inevitable component of public service
delivery.
However, the evolution of the idea of co-production, and the evolution
of the theoretical discourses on public service deliveries, opened room for more
normative interpretations of co-production as a response to the inefficiency of
both the bureaucratic and the market models of public service provision.
Furthermore, the concept evolved in line with a broader vision of participatory
and collaborative governance. Today, co-production is not limited to the
customers’ engagement in the direct service delivery, but also includes
participatory arrangements for policy designs, financing and the evaluation of
public services (Bovaird and Löffler 2012).
Along the way, advocates of co-production have unveiled an extensive
catalogue of its potential benefits. These include: better quality of services;
potential for cost reduction; increased trust between citizens and governments;
and the greater engagement of citizens in the public domain. Such enthusiasm
for co-production and its promises is justifiable within the context of its
evolution, where disappointment with both the traditional, bureaucratic model
of service delivery and the adverse effects of extensive marketization have
fostered a search for a “third way.” Nonetheless, I argue that it is crucial not
only to focus on the strengths and potential benefits associated with coproduction, but also to recognize its “dark side.”
This article sheds light on the dark side of co-production by describing
the vigilantism movement in South Africa. The major aim of this article is to
provide an insight into factors that led to emergence of this phenomenon.
Discussion on South African experiences with vigilantism is preceded by more
general considerations about citizens’ co-production of public safety.
CONTROVERSIES AROUND CO-PRODUCTION OF PUBLIC SAFETY
It is clear that crime control and crime prevention might be more
effective thanks to contributions from citizens. For instance, Meijer (2012)
describes the Dutch Burgernet project and the positive effects it entailed, where
residents of selected neighbourhoods cooperated with the police in dealing with
minor crimes. In the broader context of public safety, volunteer fire departments
are widely used, and are probably one of the most disseminated forms of coproduction (Haynes and Stein 2014).
However, Brewer and Grabosky (2014) expose the dark side of public
safety co-production, as illustrated by the history of vigilantism and lynching in
the United States. According to their study, neighbourhood watches are the
largest form of crime prevention in the U.S., and cover the residential areas of
over 40% of Americans. Some positive results of their activities are evident,
including a decreased fear of crime in some areas, or a higher citizens’
satisfaction with police performance. But despite these benefits, Brewer and
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Grabosky unveil numerous challenges associated with this police-community
co-production.
First of all, they argue that crime control provided by unprofessional
services can imply a higher risk of power abuse and excessive harm. But what
is equally important, is the risk that some groups might use neighbourhood
watches to introduce their own “safety” regime outside of state control. There
is evidence that some neighbourhood watches target selected groups of citizens,
e.g. ethnic minorities (Brewer and Grabosky 2014). Obviously, not all
participants in police-community groups are motivated by a sense of civic virtue
and public interest. For some of them, it might be a vehicle to pursue their own
vision of social order that is not compatible with existing laws. In other words,
it might be used as a strategy for capturing public services, in order to impose a
specific political and ideological view. A lack of accountability to the
community and the state invigorates this threat. Hence, co-production in crime
control appears to be a particularly risky endeavour, which may even result in a
direct and serious challenge to fundamental human rights, including personal
safety and freedom. Co-production is therefore not only an issue for the
effectiveness of the public service provision, but also is related to securing the
key values of a democratic society.
THE NATURE OF VIGILANTISM IN SOUTH AFRICA
“Fifty-one vigilante attacks have been recorded in Khayelitsha over the
past seven months – and up to nine mob justice incidents occur in the area every
month. Khayelitsha Cluster Commander Major-General Johan Brand said the
statistics included murders, attempted murders and cases of assault with intent
to do grievous bodily harm as recorded at Khayelitsha’s five police stations.
Khayelitsha, Masiphumelele and Dunoon have been marred by a spate of
vigilante attacks in recent months. While 51 incidents were reported to police
stations in Lingulethu West, Khayelitsha, Harare, Lwandle and Macassar
between April and October, 69 similar cases were reported over the same period
last year, Brand said.
Three years ago, Western Cape Premier Helen Zille identified Khayelitsha as a
problem area and established the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry to
investigate a breakdown in relations between police and the community,” as
reported on the IOL news portal dated on 4 November 2015 (Dano 2015). It is
one of many reports from recent years about vigilante attacks in South African
major cities.
However, an increasing problem of vigilantism is not a recent addition
to the list of challenges faced by this country. According to the report of the
Department of Community Safety of the Provincial Government of the Western
Cape, there has been an increase of vigilante incidents since at least 2001
(Haefele 2006). Buur and Jensen (2004) noted that some forms of vigilantism
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have already developed in the apartheid state. Some of those formations served
as a “hidden hand” of the regime, while others have been supported by liberation
forces. According to Schaerf (2001), apartheid era vigilantism could be
characterized by state-orchestrated violence against specific groups of citizens,
whereas in the post-apartheid state it is represented primarily by civilianinitiated movements set up in reaction to increasing levels of crime. Another
new form of vigilantism are organizations providing some security services for
a fee. The emergence of vigilantism in the post-apartheid state is usually linked
with the establishment of PAGAD (People Against Gangs and Drugs). This
group formed in 1996 was initially aimed at tackling high incidence of drugs
and gangs among the young population. However, it has quickly transformed
into a radical, paramilitary group planting bombs and killing people (Power and
Vermooten 2009). PAGAD declared jihad against drug dealers from the city of
Cape Town and over a few years has murdered around 100 people, not only
those involved in drug trade, but also random individuals (Martin). Moreover,
there is some evidence that some PAGAD members were actually involved in
the drug trade they were fighting against (Buur and Jensen 2004).
Another form of vigilantism in South Africa are people’s courts defined
by Swanepol, Duvenhage and Coetzee (2011) as “community-based informal
structure that takes over the judicial function of the state within that community
by acting outside the law as judge, jury and executioner with the aim of
providing order in the community through meeting out violent punishment to
alleged wrongdoers.” People’s courts could be perceived as a more advanced
form of vigilantism that goes beyond policing and involves performing judicial
functions of the state by non-state actors. Similar to community policing, the
people’s courts are rooted in historical institutions. Informal courts existed in
the rural parts of South Africa from the arrival of the first magistrates.
Urbanization and rapid growth of townships only created advantageous
conditions for further expansion of this form of non-state judiciary (Burman and
Schaerf 1990).
The approach of post-apartheid governments towards vigilantism has
been rather mixed. The African National Congress has adopted an eclectic
strategy to address the increasing problem of crime. It has primarily aimed at
legitimizing the state police. At the same time, the concept of community
policing has been also recognized as one of the major instruments
supplementing state’s intervention (Super 2015). It should be noted, though,
that there were no significant initiatives leading to more formalized and
structured involvement of vigilante movements into partnerships with the state
institutions (Schaerf 2001).
The nature of vigilantism in South Africa is similar to other countries
where this phenomenon could be observed, yet it also has some country-specific
features. For many authors discussing this phenomenon, it is clear that the
emergence of the vigilantism movement in South Africa has been triggered by
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the state’s incapacity. International comparative studies demonstrate that
vigilantism does not play a significant role in countries where the state provides
its security institutions with adequate capacities (Hoffman 2012). Wherever the
state performs its core functions more or less effectively, there is no need for
the citizens’ self-organization. Dysfunctionality of the state creates a vacuum
that could be maintained by other, non-state actors.
The Guardian reported in 2015 that house robberies reached their
highest ever annual recorded total, passing the 20,000 mark for the first time.
Furthermore, street robberies increased by around 9.7% compared with the
previous year (Smith 2015). It is obvious that security problems in South
African cities have not been effectively mitigated and the state police fail to
provide citizens with basic level of security. More affluent people react to this
by hiring more private security companies to protect their property and ensure
personal security. The number of officers working for private security
companies has already doubled the number of police officers. As a percentage
of GDP, South Africa has the largest private security sector in the world
(Abrahamson and Williams 2010). For those who cannot afford private security
coverage, civilian-initiated vigilantism movements remain the only option to
increase the level of personal security.
State’s incapacity not only creates a demand for vigilantism, but also
encourages vigilante groups by perceptions that their members would not face
any counter-measures from the state (Gutteridge and Spence 1997). If the state
is unable to provide security to the population, it will not effectively oppose the
groups aiming at taking responsibility for this task. State’s absence or passivity
is an invitation to take control over the public goods (in this case – public
security) that are not properly managed via state intervention. In that sense
vigilantism is also a strategy for establishing a new legal-political order (Buur
2006) or capturing the state by the groups building their authority on capacity
to ensure some level of security to the population of a given territory.
Gutteridge and Spence (1997) also noted that vigilantism in South
Africa (in Latin America too) is fostered by the dominant culture of violence.
This culture has strengthened by the rhetoric of post-apartheid governments
where the need for radical and brutal reaction against crime was emphasized.
High acceptance to violence manifested in the state’s policy encourages nonstate actors and creates an obstacle to holding them accountable for any abuses
or excessive use of force. Furthermore, a high number of human rights
violations committed by state officers devastates the citizens’ trust of the state
and naturally turn the population towards vigilante groups.
It should be underlined that the state’s incapacity is not the only
explanation for the expansion of vigilantism available in the literature.
Schuberth (2013) attempts to challenge this dominant approach to exploring this
phenomenon by suggesting that vigilantism results from unwillingness of the
ruling upper class to address security needs of poorer populations. In other
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words, the problem does not lie in lack of resources or general weakness of state
institutions, but in deliberate policy of the state driven by the interests of the
ruling class. If we follow this interpretation, reducing the excessive role of
vigilante groups would require not only increasing allocation of resources to
public security forces, but first empowering poorer groups in the public policy
processes. Otherwise, it is very likely that potential improvements in the
capacity of state security forces will be allocated solely to provide better
coverage to more affluent groups, strengthening the discriminatory patterns of
access to public services.

CONCLUSION
Poor performance of state’s security apparatus is clearly one of the major
factors triggering the expansion of vigilantism in South Africa. However, in the
specific context of this country vigilantism seems to also be an important
component of the traditional governance structures. This complex nature of
public security co-production in South Africa is both an opportunity and a
threat. Community engagement and experience in ensuring safety might be
utilized to foster the effectiveness of official security forces. On the other hand,
parallel, informal security groups remaining outside state’s control are prone to
excessive use of force and serious violations of citizens’ rights and freedoms. It
is clear that the most effective solution to this dilemma would be to establish
partnerships between community groups and state police forces based, for
example, on above-describe Dutch Burgernet model.
There is some evidence that such partnerships between state police and
vigilante groups occur. As Baker (2002) noted, there is an increasing exchange
of information about patterns of crime or policing techniques between state
institutions and informal groups. However, the fundamental condition for such
model to be implemented is to ensure that basic level of public security are
effectively guaranteed by the state. Community groups may provide some
added value, yet they could not replace the institutions subject to democratic
governance and accountability schemes.
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